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AMERICAN FALLS DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
DETERMINATION THAT CIT SHOULD BE ESTOPPELED FROM
CONTESTING THE VALIDITY OF THE RJW MEDIA TRUSTEE'S SALE.
In determining that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented CIT from challenging the

validity of the RJW Media Trustee's Sale, the trial court incorrectly relied on American Falls
Canal Sec. Co. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 775 P.2d 412 (Utah 1989). The present case is
readily distinguishable from American Falls because, although it may have been reasonable for
American Savings to rely on the silence of American Falls, it was unreasonable for RJW Media
to rely on the silence of CIT in conducting its Trustee's Sale.
The elements of equitable estoppel were clearly defined by the Utah Supreme Court in
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc.:
Estoppel is an equitable defense that requires proof of three elements: (i) a statement,
admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii)
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of the
first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party
that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act.
772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly affirmed the
continuing applicability of the second element of estoppel, as defined by CECO Corp., which is
that a party asserting the defense of estoppel must act reasonably on the basis of the other party's
act or failure to act.1 "In order to prevail on a claim for equitable estoppel a party must show that
the party to be estopped acted in such a way as to induce reasonable reliance by the other party .
1

Accord, Nunlev v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Utah 1999); S & G Inc. v. Intermountain
Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 741-42 (Utah 1996); Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1992);
Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20,22 (Utah 1990); Terry v. Price Mun. Corp.. 784 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1989); Shaw
Resources Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt Gushee & Bachtell P.C., 142 P.3d 560, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Dahl Inv. Co. v.
Hughes, 101 P.3d 830, 833 (Utah Ct. App. 2004); Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 601 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
Van Per Heyde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 845 P.2d 275,280 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Lake Phikas Serv. v. Valley
Bank & Trust Co.. 845 P.2d 951, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Serv.. 813 P.2d 1234,
1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Brixen &
Christopher, Architects v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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. . . " IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 73 P.3d 320, 324 (Utah 2003) (emphasis
added).
In Lake Philgas Serv. v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., this Court quoted the "three elements
necessary to a successful equitable estoppel defense," as set forth by CECO Corp., then
"focus[ed] on whether Valley Bank met the second prong of the test" and ultimately rejected
Valley Bank's equitable estoppel defense because "Valley Bank could not have reasonably relied
on MVD records in the face of actual notice given and received that those records were
inaccurate." 845 P.2d 951, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Although actual notice certainly bars a party from reasonably relying on another party's
silence, the Utah Supreme Court has also held, "[u]nder our caselaw, a party claiming an
estoppel cannot rely on representations or acts . . . if he had the means by which with reasonable
diligence he could ascertain the truth." Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 158 P.3d 1088,
1095 (Utah 2007) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
For example, in Harline v. Barker, the plaintiff sued the defendants for legal malpractice
after the plaintiff was denied discharge in bankruptcy because the defendants had failed to amend
the plaintiffs bankruptcy schedules. 854 P.2d 595, 597-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Although the
defendants argued that the plaintiff should be estopped because the order to amend was issued
prior to their representation of the plaintiff and the plaintiff never told the defendants about the
order, this Court found that equitable estoppel was not applicable:
Even though [the plaintiff] may have failed to act by not telling his attorneys about the
order to amend, we cannot say as a matter of law that it was reasonable for defendants not
to independently review the bankruptcy file. Thus, we cannot say that defendants'
reliance upon [the plaintiffs] omission was reasonable as a matter of law.
Id. at601n.5.
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As an equitable defense, the party seeking an equitable estoppel bears the burden of
proving that its reliance on the action or inaction of the other party was reasonable. IHC Health
Servs.. Inc. v. D & K Mgmt, Inc., 73 P.3d 320, 324 (Utah 2003); Warren v. Provo City Corp.,
838 P.2d 1125,1130 (Utah 1992). RJW Media has not produced any evidence to contest the fact
that it had the means by which with reasonable diligence it, like CIT, could have discovered the
Cancellation of Notice of Default. Like the defendant attorneys in Harline v. Barker that failed to
review the bankruptcy record, RJW Media's Trustee failed to review a title report prior to its
Trustee's Sale to determine whether a valid Notice of Default was recorded upon which it could
base its Trustee's Sale. Had RJW Media's Trustee acted reasonably and in accordance with
standard trustee practices, RJW Media would have discovered the Cancellation of Notice of
Default. Thus, under CECO Corp. and its progeny, RJW Media did not meet its burden of proof
with regard to the second element of an estoppel defense; it was unreasonable for RJW Media to
conduct its Trustee Sale even though CIT was silent with regard to the Cancellation of Notice of
Default.
Nevertheless, RJW Media argues that the trial court correctly relied on American Falls to
estop CIT from challenging the validity of the Trustee's Sale. In American Falls, American
Savings foreclosed on a property owned by American Falls. 775 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1989).
Prior to the sale, American Savings informed American Falls of its intention to bid the entire
amount due. Id. at 414. American Falls thus had knowledge of the disparity between the lender's
intended bid and the lesser amount that American Falls thought American Savings was entitled
for the property. Id at 415. In spite of this knowledge, American Falls failed to disclose such
disparity to American Savings prior to, or at the sale. Id. The Utah Supreme Court noted:
It readily appears that American Savings1 effort was to protect American Falls' debtor
interest by bidding the entire indebtedness against the property in order that no deficiency
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would remain for which it could hold American Falls liable. Only now, subsequent to the
sale, does American Falls seek to take advantage of that consideration and deprive
American Savings of the sum of $159,461.54 on a theory of excess.
Id. Based upon these facts, the Supreme Court estopped American Falls from asserting a claim
against American Savings for excess proceeds. Id
In analyzing the holding of American Falls, it is important to appreciate the fact that the
Supreme Court set forth the three elements of an equitable estoppel defense in CECO Corp. just
forty-nine days before the Court decided American Falls. By considering the quotations in
American Falls relied upon by RJW Media in light of the elements of an equitable estoppel
defense as established in CECO Corp., it seems apparent that although "a party otherwise in
position to object to a mortgage foreclosure sale may well be precluded from doing so based
upon . . . the doctrines of waiver and estoppel," [Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of CrossAppellee, at 9 (quoting American Falls, 414 (emphasis added)], a party will not be precluded
from objecting to a mortgage foreclosure sale when one of the three element of an equitable
estoppel defense has not been met. Similarly, while "a mortgagor may by acquiescence and
failure to assert his rights at the proper time be estopped to set up irregularities in the foreclosure
proceedings to defeat rights of the purchaser," [Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of CrossAppellee, at 9 (quoting American Falls, 414 (emphasis added)], a mortgagor will nevertheless
not be estopped if all three of the elements essential for an estoppel are not satisfied.
Thus, while it may have been reasonable for American Savings to make a full credit bid
at the foreclosure sale based on American Falls silence, it was unreasonable for RJW Media to
conduct its Trustee's Sale based on CIT's silence regarding the Cancellation of Notice of
Default.

5

In any event, even if this Court finds that American Falls stands for an exception to the
second prong of CECO Corp. that a party's reliance on the party to be estopped must be
reasonable (which no court has ever done), this so-called American Falls exception would have
been eliminated by the Utah Supreme Court in 1992. In Warren v. Provo City Corp., the
Supreme Court unequivocally held, "[a]s is true in all cases of equitable estoppel, for the
doctrine to be invoked a showing must be made that, under the circumstances, the party claiming
estoppel has acted in a reasonable manner." 838 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1992) (emphasis
added).
Bearing the burden of proof, RJW Media completely failed to demonstrate that it acted in
a reasonable manner. The undisputed facts of the case are that it was unreasonable for RJW
Media to conduct its Trustees Sale in reliance on CIT's silence with regard to the Cancellation of
Notice of Default because RJW Media's Trustee had only to order a title report to discover for
itself the Notice of Default Cancellation. [Opening Brief of Appellees/ Cross-Appellants, 27-31]
It is upon this basis that the trial court erred in relying on American Falls to deny CIT the
opportunity to enforce its Notice of Default.
Notably, RJW Media's failure to address the third element of estoppel, i.e. damages
should not be missed by the Court. While RJW Media goes to great lengths to criticize CIT for
its silence, RJW Media has not provided this Court with any analysis of any evidence to show
that has or will suffer any damages. Indeed, RJW Media has not provided any explanation or
defense to CIT's contention that the Special Warranty Deed [R. at 7, Complaint |38, Ex. H] to
RJW Media [] precludes RJW Media from being able to establish that it has any damages. If this
Court ultimately concludes that the sale is void, RJW Media will still have title to the property
because RJW Media is the grantee under the Special Warranty Deed. RJW Media will also be
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entitled to record a Notice of Default and proceed to enforce its Deed of Trust. Since RJW
Media will own the property and have an enforceable Deed of Trust, it is difficult to see how
RJW Media has been damaged by the CIT Notice of Default, and absent any damages, RJW
Media is not entitled to estoppel.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONCLUDE THAT THE TRUSTEE'S SALE
WAS VALID.
A.

THE HOLDING OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT THAT THE
TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS VALID, BUT THAT CIT WAS ESTOPPED
FROM CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF THE TRUSTEE'S SALE.

RJW Media misrepresents the holding of the trial court in claiming that "the trial court
correctly concluded that the trustee's sale was valid." [Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross-Appellee, page 11]. Equitable remedies do not validate that which is invalid by law, and in
no part of the trial court's holding does the trial court proclaim that the RJW Media Trustee's
Sale was valid. Quite the contrary, the fact that the trial court relied on the equitable remedy of
estoppel lends credence to the conclusion that the trial court did not think that the Trustee's Sale
was legally valid. If the Trustee's Sale was legally valid, there would have been no need for the
trial court to resort to equity. By resorting to equity, the trial court implicitly held that the
Trustee's Sale was legally invalid.
B.

RJW MEDIA'S FAILURE TO BASE ITS TRUSTEE'S SALE ON A VALID
NOTICE OF DEFAULT WAS AN ERROR THAT RENDERED THE
TRUSTEE'S SALE VOID.

Contrary to RJW Media's attempt to re-characterize its Trustee's failure to record a
Notice of Default as an "immaterial error" or a "technical defect," RJW Media's failure to

2

RJW Media contends that if "the interests of the trustor/debtor in having the property sold at a fair price" are
protected, then the "sufficiency of the notice or the validity of a subsequent sale will not be affected by immaterial
errors and mistakes." Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Occidental/ Nebraska Fed. Sav.
Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217,220 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). [on page 11 of its Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross-Appellee]

7

record a Notice of Default was effectively a jurisdictional defect that completely voided the sale
and deprived RJW Media's Trustee of any authority to conduct its Sale.
In Utah, "[t]he power of sale . .. may not be exercised until: (1) the trustee first files for
record . . . a notice of default.. .." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-25 (2007). This power of sale statute,
in absolute terms, completely prohibits a trustee from conducting a power of sale foreclosure in
the absence of a valid notice of default.
Thus, failure to record a notice of default is akin to the failure of a district court to obtain
subject matter jurisdiction: any judgment by the district court and any foreclosure by the trustee
are both legally void due to their lack of authority. See e.g. Diehl Lumber Transport, Inc. v.
Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739, 742 (Utah App. 1990) (concluding that failure to commence action for
foreclosure of mechanics lien within time prescribed by statute deprived the trial court of
authority to adjudicate lien foreclosure action). If a trustee lacks authority under the law,
equitable principles such as waiver and estoppel cannot be used to grant authority. The Utah
Supreme Court acknowledged as much in American Falls when it noted that estoppel and waiver
are not applicable "where non-compliance results in a complete legal nullity." American Falls,
775P.2dat413.
In the present case, the district court found that the Cancellation of the Notice of Default
filed by First Southwestern Title was valid. [R. 526-533]. The natural result of the Cancellation
was termination of the pending Notice of Default and elimination of any trustee's authority to
conduct a sale until another notice of default was recorded. By failing to record a valid Notice of

3

RJW Medias references Occidental/ Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr. 791 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), Timm
v. Dewsnup. 86 P.3d 713 (Utah 2003), and Concepts. Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah
1987) to bolster its argument that a "technical defect" prior to a Trustee's Sale is not sufficient to invalidate the
Trustee's Sale if "the defect was known to the party later seeking to set the sale aside" and "the defect ultimately had
no negative effect on the sale sufficient to warrant setting the sale aside." [Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross-Appellee, pages 11-12].
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Default, RJW Media's trustee never obtained statutory authority to conduct its Trustee's Sale. By
holding its Trustee's Sale after having failed to obtain statutory authority, that non-compliance
rendered the sale a complete legal nullity. Being a complete legal nullity, the district court should
have found that the RJW Media Trustee's Sale was void, and allowed CIT to proceed with
enforcement of its Notice of Default.
C.

CIT IS NOT REQUIRED TO PRODUCE ACTUAL PROOF THAT THE
BIDDING WAS CHILLED.

RJW Media last argues that CIT failed to produce evidence that the Cancellation chilled
the bidding or caused an inadequacy in the price. This conclusion ignores the fact that CIT
elected not to bid because in its view the cancellation deprived the trustee of authority to conduct
the sale. Furthermore, the conclusion is an erroneous application of the standard and ignores the
practicality of producing actual proof that bidding was chilled.
Utah Courts have recognized that a sale will be set aside where defects in the foreclosure
sale process are those that would, "have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing an
inadequacy of price." (internal citations omitted) Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Services,
Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987). Likewise immaterial errors and mistakes will not
invalidate a sale, where the mistake or error is such that the rights of those with in an interest in
the property have been protected. Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d
217, 220 (Utah App. 1990). And the burden is upon the party challenging the sale to prove these
contentions. Concepts, Inc., 743 P.2d at 1159.
Neither this Court of the Utah Supreme Court have directly addressed whether the party
challenging the sale must produce direct evidence that the bidding was in fact, chilled, or
whether the burden in simply to show that the error, mistake, or defect was of a type which the
circumstances would reasonably result parties electing not to bid. By implication, language from
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Concepts, Inc., suggest the correct burden is the latter; the Court stated, "The remedy of setting
aside a sale will be applied only in cases which reach unjust extremes." Concepts, Inc., 743 P.2d
at 1159. This statement seems to indicate that the Court must look at the entire circumstances
surrounding the sale to determine whether the alleged defect is such that an unjust outcome must
be corrected. And while direct evidence or a party not bidding because of procedural defects
would be probative, such direct evidence is not exclusively determinative of whether the bidding
would have been chilled.
In Gilroy v. Ryberg, 667 N.W. 2d 544, (Neb 2003), the owner of property who defaulted
on an obligation secured by a deed of trust, subsequently sought to have the sale set aside by
claiming that the content of the Notice of Default failed to specifically comply with the
requirements of the Nebraska statute. In applying the same standard as the used in Utah for
determining the burden of proof, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated,
often it will be difficult to identify credible witnesses willing to testify that but for
the trustee's error, they would have come to the sale and bid higher than the sale
price. Thus, we conclude that the party seeking to set aside the sale need not
necessarily present such direct evidence. Rather, the party may meet its burden by
establishing that (1) the defect, by its nature, would have a tendency to result in a
reduced sale price and (2) the sale price was inadequate.
Gilroy, 667 N.W. 2d at 634.
Here, CIT has produced evidence that it did not attend the sale and bid, because in
CIT's opinion, the sale was void for want of authority. Moreover, the lack of a pending
notice of default, in the presence of an express statutory command for the trustee to file a
notice of default to obtain a power of sale, is a defect which would have the natural and
expected effect of chilling the bidding.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the opening brief of CrossAppellees, the Cross-Appellee's request that the decision of the trial court, estopping
Cross-Appellee's from enforcing the CIT Notice of Default be reversed, that the sale be
deemed void, and the CIT be allowed to proceed with its foreclosure.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS A ^ _ day of December, 2007

o

Dana T. Farmer
Attorney for Cross Appellees
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